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ABSTRACT 
 
This article analyses risk’ and stakeholders’ management in the project to establish a product created by BNDES 
to provide partial credit guarantees for micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), the Investment Guarantee 
Fund (FGI). The project went through several adjustments during its development to adapt it to changes in the 
credit market, the demands of financial agents and credit access’ public policy. For this analysis were used risk 
management models, stakeholder management in projects and guarantee systems. The methodology used was 
the single case study with the fund manager, with document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The results 
of the analysis indicate that the corrections in the direction and the adequacy of the fund project development 
pace, together with stakeholder management techniques use and project risk management, led to increased 
security in the Fund  implementation, minimizing the need for rework and schedule delays. This context prevented 
several risks associated with the operation and the adequacy of the final product, contributing to a gradual but 
steady adoption of the Fund's guarantee by financial agents. 
 
Keywords: Project Management; Public Policy; Risk Management; Stakeholders Management; Project Risk 
Management.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1PhD in Business Administration at PUC-Rio Business School, Rio de Janeiro State (Brazil). Currently is taking a 
Master in Public Administration at Columbia University - NY. He is certificated in Project Management by the PMI 
and has extension in Information Logistics at PUC-Rio. Currently works at BNDES, in the credit area, with 
guarantees for access to credit for micro, small and medium enterprises. [lqlanz@yahoo.com.br] 
 
2PhD in management and she is associate professor at the PUC Business School, Rio de Janeiro State (Brazil). 
[patomei@iag.puc-rio.br] 
10.5585/iji.v4i2.89 
 Author:KhayraAichouche&RafikaBousalem 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
International Journal of Innovation (IJI Journal), São Paulo, v. 4, n. 2, pp. 59-70, Jul/Dec. 2016. 
60 
G 
 
 
ERENCIAMENTO DE RISCOS E STAKEHOLDERS NA CONCEPÇÃO  
DE UM NOVO PRODUTO FINANCEIRO 
 
RESUMO 
 
Este artigo analisa a gestão de riscos e stakeholders na gestão de projeto de criação para um produto criado pelo 
BNDES para oferecer garantias parciais de crédito para micro, pequenas e médias empresas (MPMEs), o Fundo 
de Garantia de Investimentos (FGI). O projeto passou por várias adaptações durante o seu desenvolvimento para 
o adaptar às mudanças no mercado de crédito, as demandas dos agentes financeiros e políticas públicas o acesso 
ao crédito ". Para esta análise foram utilizados modelos de gestão de riscos, gestão de stakeholders em projetos 
e sistemas de garantia. A metodologia utilizada foi o estudo de caso único com o gestor do fundo, com análise 
documental e entrevistas semi-estruturadas. Os resultados da análise indicam que as correções na direção e a 
adequação do ritmo de desenvolvimento do projeto do fundo, juntamente com técnicas de gerenciamento das 
partes interessadas utilização e gestão de risco do projeto, levou ao aumento da segurança na aplicação do Fundo, 
minimizando a necessidade de retrabalho e dos atrasos de programação. Neste contexto impediu vários riscos 
associados com a operação e a adequação do produto final, contribuindo para uma adoção gradual, mas 
constante de garantia do Fundo pelos agentes financeiros. 
 
Palavras-chave:   Gestão de Projeto; Política Pública; Gestão de Risco; Gestão de Stakeholders.
  
 
INTRODUCTION
The 2008 financial crisis, according to Freitas (2009), 
led to a "virtual paralysis in the Brazilian domestic credit 
market." The credit crunch especially affected smaller 
businesses survival chances. According to Sebrae (2013), 
micro and small enterprises (MSEs) with up to two years of 
existence had a mortality rate of 24.4%. Among the causes 
cited by entrepreneurs for the closure of activities, one of 
the main ones is the lack of access to credit, especially due 
to insufficient guarantees (Sebrae; Fubra, 2004). 
According to Lopes, Lagoa, Cardoso and Piccinini 
(2007), partial credit guarantee systems for micro, small 
and medium enterprises (MSMEs) implemented as public 
policies, can address deficiencies in the credit market. The 
guarantee funds cover part of the banks’ credit risk (banks 
are also called financial agents) in financing operations and 
play an important role in this system. 
This article analyzes, according to the project 
management practices, the implementation of the 
Investment Guarantee Fund (Fundo Garantidor para 
Investimentos - FGI), a guarantee fund managed by the 
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES). The fund was 
created by the Brazilian government as one of its reactions 
to 2008 crisis. Therefore, the emphasis will be on managing 
risks arising from product changes aiming to meet the 
needs of banks, FGI’s key stakeholders. 
This article is structured in five sections: this 
introduction, theoretical framework (and literature 
review), methodology, results analysis and discussion, 
conclusions and recommendations for future research. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
A literature review was conducted to analyze FGI 
implementation project comprising guarantee systems for 
SMEs, risk management and stakeholders’ management 
associated with process changes in projects. 
 
Guarantee Systems for SMEs 
 
According to Lanz and Perufo (2013), partial credit 
guarantee schemes can be classified into three types: 
guarantee funds (GF), guarantee programs (GP) and 
mutual guarantee associations (MGA). Based on Lanz and 
Tomei (2014), it is possible to identify some benefits of 
guarantee funds over the other models: 
 The GF can have state and private resources. 
MGA usually have only private funds (with the exception of 
possible contribution of non-reimbursable public funds) 
and GP only use public budget resources in its capital. 
 The GF have greater liquidity resources, because 
after its constitution the GF does not depend on the public 
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budget (as GP) or funding from its members (as MGA). GF 
model seeks to be self-sustaining. 
 The GF, being private, have greater freedom to 
delegate operational activities than GP, which has public 
character, and greater interconnectivity than MGA, usually 
made with regional characteristics or linked to local 
production clusters. 
According Chieza and Ambros (2006) a milestone in 
Brazil guarantee systems is the creation of public 
guarantee funds in 1996 as an alternative to improve SMEs 
credit access through providing guarantees to banks. 
However, the funds had limited scope of actuation 
because they were linked only to certain institutions 
operations as SEBRAE, with the Guarantee Fund of Small 
and Medium Enterprises [Fundo de Aval para Micro e 
Pequenas Empresas - FAMPE], BNDES with the Guarantee 
Fund for the Promotion of Competitiveness [Fundo de 
Garantia para Promoção da Competividade - FGPC] and 
Banco do Brasil, with the Guaranty Fund for Employment 
and Income Generation [Fundo de Aval para a Geração de 
Emprego e Renda - FUNPROGER]. Besides that, their 
structure, by its public nature, was closer to the guarantee 
program model, than a guarantee fund, as public budget 
dependent funds, with low liquidity. 
 
Stakeholders and Project Change 
Management  
 
According to the practices of A guide to the Project 
Management Body of Knowledge [PMBOK] from Project 
Management Institute [PMI] (2013), project management 
can be divided into ten areas of knowledge: integration, 
scope, time, cost, quality, human resources, 
communications, risk, procurement and stakeholders. A 
new product development can be analyzed from three 
perspectives: project scope, product scope and the 
relationship of these scopes with the stakeholders’ needs 
and demands, especially customers. Considering these 
perspectives FGI implementation process was analyzed in 
terms of project and product scope change management, 
in order to evaluate its adherence to stakeholders’ needs 
and demands, especially the financial agents and their 
impact on project and product risks. 
Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) proposed a dynamic 
model for stakeholders’ classification according to their 
relevance in a project based on three factors: power, 
urgency and legitimacy. The stakeholder power is its ability 
to take the organization to do something that it would not 
have to do if it was not requested. This power can be 
normative (based on law and regulation), enforced 
(through force or threat) or from utility (to retain resources 
or information). The stakeholder legitimacy is the 
perception that the actions are desirable or appropriate, in 
a specific social context. It can be classified into individual, 
organizational or social.  
The urgency indicates the need for immediate action to 
comply with stakeholder requests. The organization's 
response time should take into account the time sensitivity 
and criticality (Bourne, 2009; Mainardes, Alves, Raposo 
and Domingues, 2010; Teixeira, 2010). 
The Stakeholders analysis, according to the PMI (2013), 
usually has three steps: identify all potential stakeholders 
and their relevant information, analysis of impact or 
potential support from each stakeholder to the project and 
assessment of how likely he will respond in various 
situations.  
According to Noro (2012) organizations should develop 
an efficient and effective communication plan with their 
key stakeholders, which make it possible to turn them into 
project supporters. 
Noro (2012) proposes a five step methodology to 
manage stakeholders: (1) Identify the relevant 
stakeholders for the organization, external, internal, or 
that interface; (2) Identify the subset of key stakeholders, 
that can threat the organization; (3) Diagnose the key 
stakeholders who support the company, who do not 
support, those with positive and negative aspects and 
those that are positioned marginally; (4) Formulate general 
strategies involving supporter stakeholders who defend 
the company against non-supporters, collaboration 
strategies with those with strengths and weaknesses in the 
relationship with the company and monitoring of those 
that are positioned on the margin (5) Implement generic 
strategies and develop specific tactics, taking responsibility 
for key stakeholders management. 
The change request process in a project may include: 
corrective action, which realigns project real performance 
with its management plan; preventive actions, to ensure 
that future performance will be aligned with the plan, 
defect correction and improvements or updates that 
reflect new ideas or content. Change requests should be 
reviewed, approved, reflected in the deliverables and 
project documentation and communicated to 
stakeholders (PMI, 2013). According to Noro (2006), 
change is no longer seen as something bad, because 
nowadays it usually refers to continuous improvement. 
The change management can be classified in various 
ways, for example, by the effort required for their 
implementation and by their impact, which can be 
incremental or innovative. Incremental change and 
continuous improvement comprises small changes, usually 
with short-term scope, but together they can impact the 
organization’s performance. Innovative change or radical 
improvement has large, long-term scope and high risks 
associated and may radically affect the organization. 
Another way to classify the change is between reactive or 
proactive, respectively in response to a problem or crisis, 
or as an opportunity for improvement (Wood, 2009; Iqbal, 
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2011; Banutu-Gomez, 2007; Kirsch, Chelliah and Parry 
2011; Oswick, Grant, Marshak and Wolfram Cox, 2010). 
 
Risk Management  
 
PMI (2013) identifies six risk management processes: 
planning risk management, identify risks, conduct a 
qualitative risk analysis, perform quantitative analysis, plan 
responses and control the risks. 
Jerônimo, Silva, Batista and Galvão (2011) identify 
some risk factors linked to the development of new 
products and processes with high uncertainty, which are 
difficult to define and to establish realistic goals. Among 
these factors are political, social, market and economic 
factors. Flexibility is required to deal with these changes. 
According to Mulisani and Garcez (2014), high-tech and 
innovation projects bring great uncertainty, requiring a 
greater number of interactions and technical skills as well 
as flexibility and interactivity during planning. Shenhar and 
Dvir (2007) proposed an approach to project management 
that considers four conceptual dimensions – Novelty, 
Technology Complexity and Pace. 
According to the authors, the higher your product 
novelty, less clear are the initial information, which impact 
estimates, and since this will be less accurate, riskier the 
product. This situation requires greater flexibility and 
creativity to bring projects to a successful conclusion. 
To Vencato (2014), the project risks management can 
only be set from the activity measurement. Risk 
management arises from the expected activity, the need 
to control the future, to ensure the inputs delivery on time, 
for example, and with the expected results. 
There are two types of risks: internal project risk, that 
is linked to the development process, connected to the 
areas of knowledge defined in the PMBOK Guide (2013), 
and external or business risk, that is linked to the final 
product of the project (PMI, 2013). 
According to Napolitano and Rabechini Junior (2012), 
organizations are part of a socio-technical environment, 
subject to a complex structure of norms, standards and 
actions which are subject to several actors’ decisions with 
distinct interests and judging criteria. In this approach, the 
number of decisions and judgments are modeled, in a 
process that begins in the high spheres of government, 
pass by regulators and run throughout the organizational 
structure in a network of successive decisions, until it 
comes to the responsible for the task execution. 
Rabenschlag, Roratto and Dias (2012) analyzed the risk 
factors in public companies IT projects, and found that the 
bureaucratic administrative structures prevailing in 
governmental institutions are rigid, centralized, and 
directed to administrative procedures implementation and 
regulation compliance, in a way that does not stimulate the 
adoption of modern management techniques, among 
them project management. In this type of structure, 
performance management, most often, is assessed only to 
verify compliance with legal and ethical standards. 
When the product depends on the relationship 
between organizations the need for specific controls 
arises. Das and Teng (2001) identify three types of risk 
control in interorganizational relationships: output, 
behavior and social. Output control is evaluating partner 
performance. The behavior control is used to ensure that 
the processes are appropriate; and social control seeks to 
develop shared values, beliefs and common goals between 
the parties. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The research method used was the single case study 
(Yin, 2013), conducted with the fund manager, the BNDES 
in Rio de Janeiro. The research analyzes the FGI 
implantation process adopting a sequential data collection 
strategy (Creswell, 2013), that consists of two steps: (i) 
analysis of the main changes of FGI’s contractual and 
regulatory instruments (by-laws, regulations, manuals and 
circulars), assessing their impact on the project scope, the 
risks and stakeholders relationships; (ii) semi-structured 
interviews with managers and operational staff of the 
Fund’s administrator, comprising the research’s 
constructs. 
The semi-structured interviews comprise a total of 10 
people using as a basis the Table 1. The interview script 
base was adjusted to obtain information about the 
research constructs.
Table 1 - Interview Script 
Question Aim of the question 
1. How was defined the FGI Project Scope?   Understand how the project scope was defined. 
2. How is the structure of FGI? How it differs from other funds 
or guarantee schemes? Explain. 
Identify the type of guarantee system implemented. Identify 
lessons learned. 
3. What are the main stakeholders in the project? What is the 
role of each stakeholder?  
Identify key stakeholders and their role in the project. 
4. How was the relationship and communication with the 
stakeholders?  
Identify how the relationship and communication with 
stakeholders was. 
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5. How the requests and interests of stakeholders are handled 
and prioritized?  
Identify how the fund manages the stakeholders. 
6. How was the change management process? How the scope 
was managed?   
Identify change management drivers in the project. 
7. What are the main changes that occurred in the Fund? Why 
the changes were implemented?  
Identify the key changes and their causes. 
8. What are the main risks associated with the project? And 
the product? 
Identify the project and product risks and how they are classified. 
9. How does the FGI’s risk monitoring and control system 
work?  What are the main control mechanisms used? 
Identify what kind of risk’ monitoring and control the Fund uses. 
10. Describe the FGI’s performance in financial terms, number 
of customers (market share) and in terms of banks’ 
satisfaction? 
Identify performance perception. 
Source(s): Prepared by the Authors. 
 
The subject’s selection criteria were convenience and 
accessibility. Interviews were recorded and transcripted. 
Content analysis was used to extract the respondents’ 
perceptions about the topics covered. The managers 
interviewed have between 5 and 10 years of BNDES. Their 
academic formations are economists, business, 
accountants and lawyers. The interviews followed the 
guidelines of the BNDES ethics code. Confidential data and 
information protected by law about the FGI were omitted 
from the final report.
 
 
Table 2: Interview Participants  
Divisions Respondents Attributions 
Department Chief 1 interviews Responsible for FGI 
Product and Project 3 interviews Development of new products and adjustments to existing 
products and standards. 
Institutional Relationship 2 interviews Institutional relations and training of financial agents 
Operations 2 interviews Operating activities as analyzing honor claims and payments, 
credit recovery and auditing. 
Legal 2 interviews Responsible for legal support to all divisions, contracts 
elaborations, fund regulation and standardization. 
Source(s): Prepared by the Authors. 
 
Considering that it is a single case study, with 
qualitative analysis, it is not possible to perform statistical 
generalizations from its results to other guarantee funds or 
other industry entities, such as insurance companies. This 
constrain was not considered a problem, because the 
research aim was to generate theoretical propositions, 
analytical generalizations (Yin, 2013), and contribute to 
improve the guarantee schemes for access to credit for 
MSMEs, innovation diffusion in financial products and 
services and project management theory. 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
The analysis of the fund's implementation was made by 
comparing the actions taken by the Fund managers, 
identified through FGI documentation analysis and 
interviews, and theoretical recommendations for 
guarantee schemes for MSMEs best practices, concerning 
risk management, stakeholders relationships, and change 
management to adapt the scope of the product to market 
requests. 
Project’s initial scope was defined by the boundaries of 
Brazilian Law 12,087 (2009) that authorized government 
participation in guarantee funds for MSMEs and 
establishes that these funds must be managed by a federal 
public institution, and the lessons learned from the 
previous fund, FGPC, which, according to Chieza and 
Ambros (2006), had the nature of a guarantee program. 
FGPC was managed in a bureaucratic way, excessively 
restricted by  regulation and legal norms, in a view 
consistent with Rabenschlag et al. (2012). Fund 
management is embedded in a public policy of 
government, a view consistent with Lopes et al. (2007) and 
subject to a framework of rules, as predicted by Napolitano 
and Rabechini Junior (2012). According to one respondent: 
 
... FGI's initial scope was based on the lessons learned 
from FGPC experience, “trial and error”. FGPC is a fund 
that no longer grants new guarantees. It was a public fund, 
with public resources, that is… or because of that, it had 
budget constraints from the government... 
 
In interviews, some people mentioned the main 
features that differentiate the guarantee funds from other 
guarantee schemes, as proposed by Lanz and Perufo 
(2013) and Lanz and Tomei (2014), features as being a 
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private fund with public and private resources, high 
liquidity and operation delegated to banks (financial 
agents). 
 
Especially compared to FGPC as I had told you, that was 
a public fund, which was affected by governmental budget 
constraints, FGI brought, in my opinion, a great evolution, 
the fact that it is a private fund. 
 
... and because the fund is private, it allows a much 
more agile claim payment process to operations that 
defaulted. This is a differential that the fund presented, 
based on lessons learned from FGPC mistakes, which had 
a long claim payment process, because of governmental 
budget constraints. 
 
FGI has the capital from Federal Government and 
BNDES, which are the resources that allow the fund to 
offer guarantees, but besides that the Fund also has the 
contribution of the financial agents. Although these latter 
do not provide sufficient resources for the fund to grants 
guarantees... they establish a commitment towards 
operations, there is a shared risk. 
  
Then the financial agents, having to contribute to 
operate with the Fund ... there is a risk sharing with 
financial agents... 
 
The interviews show clearly that FGI is a significantly 
improved product that took advantage of previous 
experiences and lessons learned from the FGPC. FGI 
contracting process and operation is basically the same as 
FGPC, but improvements are introduced, such as its 
private nature, with resources from financial agents and 
assets segregation from its administrator. This innovation 
however generated understanding difficulties by financial 
agents and brought regulatory questions that were 
addressed to the Central Bank and the Government, 
because despite being a private fund, it is managed by a 
public institution. 
 
... BNDES, as fund manager referred consulting the 
Central Bank with the main questions presented by the 
financial agents in relation to accounting and provisioning 
operations guaranteed by the FGI... 
  
FGI guarantee provides financial agents with a more 
favorable capital provision for their operations in 
accordance with Central Bank rules, through Circular CMN 
3,644 / 2013 (which canceled and replaced the Circular 
3,360/2007. This was modified in 2009 by Circular 3,471 
that includes guarantee funds with stop loss, as FGI). 
The main stakeholders in view of the respondents were 
the Federal Government, BNDES, the MSMEs that benefit 
from the guarantee to access credit and financial agents, 
the latter being the most relevant for defining changes in 
project scope (PMI, 2013; Noro, 2012). The Fund operates 
three types of financial agents: commercial banks, regional 
development agencies and automakers banks (associated 
with trucks and bus financing – Procaminhoneiro Program). 
 
... Stakeholders are DEPOG, that’s the department that 
manages the funds both FGI, and FGPC; Financial agents, 
operating the fund, the final beneficiaries of these 
operations and also there are other shareholders, which 
are the Federal Government and the BNDES, participating 
in the Council of Shareholders. In my view these are the 
stakeholders. Maybe other instances of BNDES own 
hierarchy can also be included, as the credit area 
supervisor, which the DEPOG is subordinate, the director 
responsible for the credit area, the board of directors as a 
whole and the president of the bank (BNDES). 
 
We have three types of financial institutions: 
commercial banks, development agencies and the 
automaker banks, which joined the fund specifically for 
compulsory guarantee to the Procaminhoneiro program. 
 
There is a team that deals exclusively with the financial 
agents’ relationship. They are responsible for attracting 
new agents, training and disseminating the Fund. 
 
BNDES has sought to simplify its processes to make 
them more compatible with the financial agents’ business 
routines.   
 
Stakeholders’ relevance analysis followed Mitchell et 
al. (1997) proposed model and the PMBOK practices (PMI, 
2013), as can be seen in the prioritization process, that 
takes into account the urgency, legitimacy and power, 
highlighting the normative aspects and potential threats to 
the fund, which can be associated with the coercive power 
(Bourne, 2009; Mainardes et al, 2010; Teixeira, 2010). 
 
Well, the demands that arise through financial agents, 
they are requests, so they do not necessarily have to be 
met and not all of them are viable, because the financial 
agents seek facilities for their own operations. Then the 
financial agents’ requests are mapped and evaluated, to 
verify if they can be met. From the moment that the 
request if from more than one agent, they began to gain 
momentum and enter into a department priority ranking 
for change implementation. 
 
Other operational changes, they have a high priority, 
very often due to legal consequences that we may suffer, 
especially if related to lack of control issues, or maybe, 
some legal loophole that may not have been satisfied that 
our legal department identity and alert. So, I think that the 
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priority for the change requests fulfillment goes to 
operational and legal risks. 
 
FGI operates through risk sharing with financial agents. 
In the fund initial design commercial banks were 
encouraged to assume more risk through a spread 
limitation mechanism linked to the guarantee percentage 
assumed by the commercial bank. There is a delegation of 
procurement activities and credit analysis to financial 
agents, which minimizes transaction costs of the fund. FGI 
also has a limitation of the level of claims payment of 7% 
of the contracted portfolio, which reduces asymmetry 
information effect, addressing the most common 
difficulties identified related to development banks and 
government action towards MSMEs support. 
 
The fund guarantees from 20% to 80% of the credit 
amount in the liability side, from financial agent to the 
BNDES. The fact that the financial agent always assumes a 
portion of the risk minimizes adverse selection and moral 
hazard. 
 
With regard to the project management during the FGI 
implementation, it is clear the concerns to keep the project 
on time and on budget, as Vencato (2014) proposes and 
minimize future operational risks by automating and 
simplifying the product: 
 
I think that the main risks were to deliver the project 
on time, but the project was structured a certain way at its 
beginning to be capable to absorb some adjustments, 
because the product was innovative, had not been done 
before here at the Bank. Many things had to be revised 
over time, so it ended up delaying the project. This was one 
of the main risks involved and also had the risk of 
acceptance by the financial agents that are the fund's 
customers, and somehow, cost too, since as time passes 
and the project does not end, the cost increases. I think 
these are the main risks: product acceptance, time and 
cost. 
 
FGI always seeks to automatize process to minimize 
operational risk, so I would say that today the only thing 
that's manual are the audit procedures, since it could not 
be done automatically, using IT, in this case there is no 
automation. All you can use IT process the FGI automated 
since the FGI process is a large-scale operation and does 
not allow manual operations. It would be too costly and 
would be neither appropriate in the sense of risk, or the 
sense of cost and benefit. 
 
The fund has developed throughout the project a series 
of controls related to the product. There are output 
controls, according to interview respondents, linked to 
various performance indicators. However most of them 
seem to be linked to performance indicators of FGI itself. 
It appears there isn´t an active work to extend the 
dissemination of these indicators to the financial agents, 
maybe because most of them are automated. 
 
FGI's indicators are used mainly to verify that the fund 
is fulfilling its role in facilitating access to credit to MSMEs, 
than to track financial agents performance. We have 
regional deconcentration indicators, focusing on North 
and Northeast (the least developed Brazilian regions), new 
borrowers, which are companies that never contracted 
operations with BNDES; comparison between FGI 
operations risk and BNDES operations risk; FGI 
participation in each line and program eligible to its 
guarantee. 
 
The cases where controls and indicators are used to 
monitor the agents are those related with FGI rules 
compliance, such as 7% stop loss, exposure value, margin 
to operate, operation value limit by guarantee and 
beneficiary. 
 
[...] Quarterly we raised some performance 
information on financial agents with FGI and set our 
contacts, our contact priorities and how this contact is 
going to be conducted. Also because of this, sometimes 
reactively due the demand of a financial agent, or if a 
financial agent had a change of someone on their team and 
the new team does not know anything about FGI, we visit 
the financial agent and we arrange a training to familiarize 
these people with our processes. So, we have some clear 
issues that are reactive and will always be, those demands 
that arise unexpectedly by a financial agent. However, we 
are trying rather to have a more proactive and strategic 
approach, mainly based on these quarterly reports that we 
are generating. 
 
The output control is used to monitor the results of the 
alliance from the fund manager's perspective. As Das and 
Teng (2001) proposed, these controls are used for cases in 
which the measurement is accurate, which is the case for 
all financial indicators evaluated in this case. 
The fund has a number of automated controls that act 
as financial agents’ behavior regulators. There is a great 
understanding of the processes by the administrator, 
which makes this is the main form of control used, because 
there is a high programmability and low measurement 
outputs, situation that according to Das and Teng (2001) 
makes this the most appropriate control. 
 
Adverse selection and moral hazard are mitigated by 
risk sharing in each operation and the existence of the stop 
loss mechanism, which limits the losses of the fund to 7% 
of each agent portfolio. 
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... The fund has some limits that minimize its risk, such 
as portfolio coverage limits in each tranche (5 years 
period), minimum collateral for operations over R$ 1 
million and a R$ 10 million per beneficiary guarantee 
limit... 
 
... There is a concentration limit, a maximum guarantee 
value for financial agent, which was 2 times the Fund 
equity and is being expanded to 4 times equity... 
 
... The system checks the limits when a financial agent 
contracts its guarantee. 
 
There are also behavioral controls, where it is clear a 
quest for procedures simplification, greater delegation and 
autonomy to the financial agents, seeking to create 
flexibility, as proposed by Jerônimo et al. (2011): 
 
A major change was in the claim process. In the initial 
design the fund provided guarantee payment by each 
financial installment, according to the original schedule of 
the loan operation. This process, despite committing fewer 
resources from FGI was very complex, for the Fund, the 
BNDES and the financial agents. It involved the need of 
monthly calculations and payments. These were 
undesirable, due to the fact that some operations can 
reach up to 120 months. The process has been simplified 
for settlement of the guaranteed portion of the 
transaction at once, keeping the original operation 
schedule for the amount of risk assumed by the financial 
agent. 
 
... The recovery process has been changed a few times, 
all aimed to simplification. 
 
In the interviews were highlighted the internal 
processes maturity level and the gradual improvement of 
external processes: 
 
About internal and external processes I think we are 
already quite mature, there was a time that lasted a long 
time, of implementation of this process, that we were 
refining what is there, but we're quite mature in this sense, 
the performance goes well. And I believe that concerning 
performance there isn’t much more to gain, there are the 
internal processes which have very good quality, that 
provides an effective and an efficient operation. 
 
Let me see, from the process point of view, I will 
separate into internal and external processes that help the 
realization of financial agents’ transactions. In relation to 
internal processes, I understand that the fund is successful, 
because we suffer internal and external audits and internal 
controls verifications - that is not even considered an audit, 
and we have always been well evaluated, never had an 
appointment. We already had some improvement 
suggestions and recommendations, but all were met and 
have been resolved. So from the point of view of internal 
processes we are successful. And from the point of view of 
external processes, which I will translate as operating 
procedures, which aids the financial agents operations, I 
understand that we still have much to improve to facilitate 
the agents operations. We understand there is still much 
potential for procedures improvement, however, what I 
had seen is a lot of barriers, especially legal issues, risks 
that we may end up generating. Certain changes are not 
implemented, we had to respond negatively to the 
requests of some financial agents, because it has certain 
demands… we cannot meet then because of legal 
requirements, according to the Brazilian legal issues and 
because of that we still have to improve.  
But we have striven to implement the changes that 
were possible. Then I would say that we still have 
improvements to perform in external operating 
procedures that aid the realization of financial agents’ 
transactions. 
 
The decision process about the Fund development and 
objectives that was concentrated in the manager, the 
BNDES, gradually starts to involve more the partners, the 
financial agents. According to the Fund managers, the 
latest rules changes have been validated with the 
potentially affect financial agents before its 
implementation. 
 
At first, it was required that the financial agent 
presented preliminary injunction to every claim that they 
request from the Fund. This was a legacy of FGPC. A first 
step was to dispense with the presentation of legal 
measures to values of up to R$ 30,000, the same value 
used as a reference for dismissal of lawsuits by income tax 
laws. Even this figure proved to be low, because as the 
fund pay claims from defaults that occurred between 90 
days and one year ago, not always the financial agent 
already filled a collection action before presenting their 
claim to the Fund. The rule was relaxed to dismiss the proof 
of prior judicial order to pay the claim request of the 
financial agent for amounts of up to R$ 300,000. The agent 
can follow the milestones and deadlines set in its collection 
policy. The legal department of the BNDES only maintained 
the requirement that the financial agent cannot let the 
credit prescribe. 
 
The new types of guarantees being implemented, as 
operations indirect guarantee and free credit guarantee, 
or those still being structured as guarantee to BNDES 
Credit Card operations, seek largely to align interests and 
objectives between the Fund management and the 
financial agents, as proposed by Das and Teng (2001) 
model. 
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Recently was launched a new indirect guarantee 
regulation for capital goods loan operations by 
manufacturers to MSMEs. To elaborate this regulation we 
had an effective participation of more than one financial 
agent interested in operating this new program. Besides 
that, it is being implemented by our IT department the 
possibility to guarantee to free credit operations, with 
financial agents own resources. In addition, we are 
evaluating the possibility to guarantee the BNDES Credit 
Card operations, which today is the product with the 
highest volume of BNDES operations. With these new 
products interest to operate with the fund should increase. 
 
BNDES assumed both roles as administrator and first 
financial institution to offer loans with the fund guarantee, 
preparing the framework for the subsequent use of the 
Fund as private credit guarantor.  
 
... FGI currently only guarantees BNDES credit facilities, 
transferred to MSMEs by financial agents... 
 
The national / state Sebrae system and regional 
development agencies were used as a support for the FGI 
implementation, facilitating its dissemination and MSMEs 
access to its guarantee. The fund also has the lowest cost 
for long term operations to the beneficiary between the 
guarantee funds currently operating in Brazil, the FGO and 
Fampe. 
 
... We participate in a working group with the Sebrae, 
which manages the Fampe and the Banco do Brasil who 
runs the FGO, which aims to improve credit access 
conditions for MSMEs... 
 
... The FGI guarantee now has the lowest cost of the 
market... 
 
We maintain a discussion group with the Banco do 
Brasil, FGO manager, and Sebrae, Fampe manager, to 
discuss the evolution of guarantee funds for MSMEs in 
Brazil. The experience exchange about accounting 
provisioning processes, credit recovery and regulatory 
issues have been very rich. 
 
The Brazilian Association of Developing [Associação 
Brasileira de Desenvolvimento - ABDE], that congregates 
developing banks and regional developing agencies, has 
been strengthened, and was one of the first entities to 
receive information about the FGI. The requests of the 
ABDE participating agents, because of their legitimacy, 
were prioritized between changes in the Fund, such as 
changing the tranche period, which was a critical factor to 
increasing the participation of these agents in FGI 
operations. 
 
Another interesting change was the increase from 
three to five years in the Fund tranche which favored 
smaller financial agents operations, such as development 
agencies and regional development banks... 
 
... The increased from 3 to 5 years in the tranche allows 
the smaller agents to compose a more diversified portfolio 
and have more time to contract this portfolio and share 
the risk, so they do not cease to receive claims’ payments 
due to the stop loss so early. 
 
To have greater chances of success, FGI seek to be a 
service that meets customer needs that were not yet 
adequately met, and meets the needs beyond what the 
consolidated entities provide. So FGI focused on long-term 
operations, investments in modernization and increased 
productive capacity, while most guarantee systems just 
meet the short-term working capital needs. 
 
... The FGI offers guarantees for long-term operations... 
 
... The average maturity of guaranteed operations is 70 
months, we have operations with a maturity of up to 120 
months... 
 
... The FGO, from Banco do Brasil provides guarantee to 
short-term operations and the FGI provides guarantees to 
long-term investment operations with BNDES resources... 
 
Despite these adjustments to the customer needs the 
FGI diffusion rate has been relatively slow, which is 
compatible with the vision of Shenbar and Dyir (2007). In 
the adoption process analysis, it was identified that it is 
first necessary that financial agents take knowledge of 
fund, became interested in joining, after evaluating if the 
cost-benefit ratio is interesting (because there is the 
capital opportunity cost from their shares of the fund, in 
addition to necessary adjustments in their computer 
systems). Even after these steps, some agents only 
experience the Fund; however they are slow to adopt it as 
part of their regular line of products. 
 
Among the smaller financial agents FGI adoption has 
been quite significant, mainly due to the fact they do not 
need to develop IT platforms in order to operate FGI. 
 
... However, the big commercial banks, due to the need 
of automated systems to operate FGI guarantee, have had 
that adoption postponed. 
 
... In my assessment the performance of smaller 
financial agents has been a significant interest and the 
largest has had a slightly lower performance, greatly 
depending on the IT issue and the issue of the long term 
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involved in the Brazilian judicial collection process, 
demanded by the Fund for some operations.  
 
The management of FGI has sought to demonstrate 
flexibility, adapting the fund rules and characteristics, 
through changes to make it more attractive for financial 
agents. 
 
... I can perhaps highlight 2 or 3 adaptations and 
changes that the fund has implemented throughout its life. 
One is that once a year we have to review “k factor” used 
to calculate the Fund fee for guarantee concession, which 
is a formula. And we have to do this review at least on an 
annual basis. Since the fund was established, we have 
made some k factor reductions to lower the burden to the 
financial agent and the final beneficiary. This is an 
interesting change. 
 
The results indicate that the search for a balance 
between meeting the demands of key stakeholders, 
financial agents and the maintenance of adequate project 
and product controls appears to be the best way to achieve 
project success, minimizing the changes impact over risks 
and predicted milestones. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The article analyzed the FGI project implementation 
using document analysis and interviews. The analysis 
shows that the project scope definition sought to address 
the known problems identified by guarantee funds 
previous experiences. The FGI is a significantly improved 
product compared to the FGPC, having been created with 
private nature, participation of the financial agents, 
improved governance structures, claim payment and 
credit recovery simplified processes. 
Besides that, key stakeholders concerns were 
identified throughout the project and their solution were 
addressed, with financial agents’ diversification to include 
regional development agencies and automaker banks, 
besides commercial banks. Involvement of the Sebrae and 
ABDE in this process, Central Bank definition for 
accounting specific rules and regulatory capital 
requirements for the fund’s guarantee. The risks that 
prevented direct transactions with  MSMEs, as transaction 
costs and information asymmetry, were treated with the 
creation of simplified contracting mechanisms, maximum 
coverage limits per agent (7% of the portfolio) and 
maximum risk sharing (up to 80%) 
Despite this careful initial structuring, the management 
and relationship process with stakeholders identified a 
number of design changes needs that were evaluated and 
implemented through a change management process, as 
proposed by Mitchell et al. (1997) and PMI (2013) to make 
the fund more attractive to the financial agents, the main 
interested party and responsible for the spread of this new 
product. A relationship structure was established with 
specialized personnel, which has sought to use the 
experience and stakeholders opinions to make changes 
that highlight the product strengths. 
Among these changes we can highlight the tranche 
term expansion from three to five years, actions to 
decreased guarantee fees and administrative costs, 
simplified outstanding balance control and claim processes 
for values up to BRL 300 thousand, and new credit 
recovery rules, which has become more adherent to the 
procedures usually adopted by financial agents for their 
operations without FGI’s guarantee. 
Despite initial actions related to regulation by the 
Central Bank; market by the financial agents; and 
technology with the creation and further simplification of 
the web relationship platform, challenges remain to 
increase the adoption of the fund. These challenges relate 
in particular to improvements in the regulation, with a 
lower provisioning for potential losses by financial agents, 
nowadays 50% of the guarantee and exemptions in the tax 
levied on the fund, which is subject to income tax, plus 
simplifications in credit recovery and IT platform, affecting 
agents due to their complexity. With these changes, the 
relative advantage and the fund's compatibility with the 
practices of financial agents will increase, and the diffusion 
rate should increase. 
Future research suggestions could include comparative 
studies between Brazilian system, other international 
experiences and other guarantee arrangements available 
in the country with qualitative approaches, through the 
evaluation of experts and market participants; and 
quantitative, relating each guarantee mechanism with its 
performance in terms of the number operations, 
beneficiary profiles, volume of guarantees granted, default 
and recovery rates. 
Considering the public policy vision of credit access 
improvement, other funds, such as FGO, from Banco do 
Brasil, Fampe from Sebrae, and new guarantees products 
as BNDES Credit Card, microcredit operations, mutual 
guarantee associations and local productive clusters. 
Under the project management perspective further 
research could aim to analyze other PMBOK knowledge 
areas, especially communications management and 
integration focusing on guarantee schemes 
implementation.
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